Cognitive Science, quite simply, attempts to provide solutions to the question of how mind and brain are related or, more generally, what constitutes mind/brain. Classical cognitive science (CCS), together with its subdiscipline of arti cial intelligence (AI), is based on Newell and Simon's (1976) explicit commitment to thè Physical Symbol System Hypothesis' | the idea that all intelligent action and behaviour can be necessarily and su ciently described and explained by symbols and rules operating on those symbols, where the rules themselves have symbolic form. Furthermore, these rules and symbols must be realised in any system for which claims of intelligent action and behaviour are made. 1 AI's concern has been with computational representations of physical symbol systems.
Background
Cognitive Science, quite simply, attempts to provide solutions to the question of how mind and brain are related or, more generally, what constitutes mind/brain. Classical cognitive science (CCS), together with its subdiscipline of arti cial intelligence (AI), is based on Newell and Simon's (1976) explicit commitment to thè Physical Symbol System Hypothesis' | the idea that all intelligent action and behaviour can be necessarily and su ciently described and explained by symbols and rules operating on those symbols, where the rules themselves have symbolic form. Furthermore, these rules and symbols must be realised in any system for which claims of intelligent action and behaviour are made. 1 AI's concern has been with computational representations of physical symbol systems.
CCS and AI have been attacked on the following three grounds: (a) that rule-following by itself is not su cient (and may not even be necessary) for intelligence, awareness and consciousness; (b) that because CCS and AI are anti-materialist and perhaps anti-reductionist in nature they cannot explain how brain gives rise to mind and therefore cannot provide adequate accounts of mind/brain; and (c) that CCS and AI, because they succumb to the same formal limits that apply to computation and algorithms, cannot account for certain types of mental processes which fall outside the class of what can be computed. 2 With regard to (a), the strongest expression of this objection to CCS and AI has come from Searle and his Chinese Room Argument (Searle, 1980) . The best reply to the actual Chinese Room scenario is the Korean Professor Argument (Rapaport, 1988) which identi es a weakness in the Chinese Room scenario (the person in the room understands the instructions to be followed) before re-describing the scenario in a form acceptable to CCS and AI. 3 More generally, though, AI addresses this problem through a form of`Systems reply': intelligence, awareness and consciousness arise from computational processes and interactions between these processes. Whether these processes are mental, physical or behavioural is irrelevant, in that the system as a whole moves through various states, where the next state of the system is determined by the current state of the system and any input it receives. The stress here is on functionality and cognitive architecture (Putnam, 1967; Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988) : The states a system goes through are representational states, and a cognitive architecture is an architecture of representational states which involves the precise nature of the representations and the operations performed over them.
With regard to (b), neuroscientists claim that an understanding of the brain is required for any account of mind, where the claim is supported by evidence that so far it has not been possible to nd an entity with a mind which/who does not also have a brain. In response to connectionist attacks (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1985; Rumelhart, McClelland et al., 1986) Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) further re ned CCS to identify three characteristics which representations in any proposed cognitive architecture have to satisfy: systematicity (the ability of a system to produce/understand some expressions is intrinsically connected to the ability to produce/understand certain others), productivity (the ability to produce/understand expressions not previously encountered), and compositionality (the ability of an item to make the same semantic contribution to each expression in which it occurs).
There have been a variety of attempts to provide connectionist representational architectures which satisfy these characteristics (e.g. van Gelder, 1990; Bod en and Narayanan, 1993; Niklasson and Sharkey, 1 Rules can be implicit rather than explicit, but symbols must be explicit (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988) . 2 Turing (1950) identi ed early versions of these objections as`The Argument from Informality of Behaviour' and`Lady Lovelace's Objection' (for (a)),`Argument from Continuity of the Nervous System' (for (b)) , and`The Mathematical Objection' (for (c)).
3 Imagine a professor in Korea who understands no English and who relies on the best available translations of Shakespeare's work in order to write, in Korean, deep, penetrating analyses of Shakespeare's plays. The Korean professor's writings are translated into English by translators and published in the best Shakespearian journals, leading to world recognition of the quality of the Korean professor's writings. If you can imagine this, then, goes the argument, this is what CCS and AI are all about: the ability to reason and be creative, within a language that can be understood, even if that language needs translating for others to understand. 1994; Christiansen and Chater, 1994; Niklasson and van Gelder, 1994) . 4 But there are two types of neuroscience. On the one hand, reductionists in general accept that, even after reduction to a neuroscienti c basis, mental processes do exist and can be described in their own terms. 5 This is to be contrasted with eliminative neuroscientists, who believe that the sort of reductionism canvassed by reductionists does not go far enough:`Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our commonsense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience' (P. M. Churchland, 1981, p206) . This leaves neuroscientists with the problem of how to account for mind/brain. The concept of emergentism is often appealed to at this point: a collection of relatively simple neuronal units, communicating with neuronal units at neighbouring levels, together perform a global (holistic) computation that none of the individual units, or linear combinations of them, could do alone. Emergentism is the idea that what are called higher level cognitive processes can be accounted for by their emergence from the neurocomputational substrate. However, there is as yet no clear neuroscienti c account of emergentism, except for references by way of analogy to the way that the microstructure of a physical object (in terms of atoms, molecules and lattice structure) can give rise to macrolevel physical properties (e.g. hardness).
The stance of CCS and AI on these issues has been that it makes as much sense to ask for details of the way the brain works when trying to understand the mind as it does to ask for details of hardware when trying to understand how a program works. That doesn't mean that an implementation of an algorithm or mind does not require hardware or a brain, respectively; rather, what is claimed is that details of the hardware/brain do not add anything to our algorithmic/mental accounts. The core question for neuroscientists,`How can the brain as material object evoke consciousness/mind?' can only be answered by appealing to representational states, and CCS and AI are best placed to o er an account of representational states, goes the argument.
With regard to (c), the Mathematical Objection (MO) is that machines will never be able to do everything human minds can do (Lucas, 1961) . This is because G odel showed that any formal system of a su ciently powerful kind cannot be both consistent and complete at the same time. This means that there will always be one statement which, if true, cannot be proved, and if proved, cannot be true. Since a computer and its program are an instantiation of a formal system, it follows that for any AI computer there will always be one statement (called the G odel Formula) which the computer cannot see as true (or provable) but which we humans can see is true (or provable). Proposers of the MO claim that this argument prove that machines can never do everything that humans can do, that machines will always be one step behind human reasoning.
AI has traditionally replied to the MO in a variety of ways. For instance, the criticism that a computer cannot`jump out of the system' assumes that systems are logically separated onto separate levels, with simple systems at the bottom and increasingly complex systems at higher levels. But in CCS and AI the brain is at the bottom level, and the brain, if it is describable mathematically at all, will have a complex mathematical description. The only way to understand the brain is to`chunk' it on higher and higher levels, thereby losing precision until perhaps at the higher levels we have`informal' systems (Hofstadter, 1979) . That is, levels in a mathematical proof and levels in AI are not the same. Therefore, what a mathematician and an AI researcher jump out of and into are di erent also. 6 2 Biomolecular foundations of mind/brain However, a fourth objection is now surfacing which presents serious di culties for both CCS and neuroscience. The fourth objection | that consciousness is biomolecular and that any account of the mind/brain which does not take into account the behaviour of biomolecules is doomed to failure | undercuts neuroscience which stresses neurons as the primitive computational element as well as classical cognitive science which stresses a cognitive system passing through various representational states. As Penrose (1994, p357) says:
4 Searle (1987) proposed a form of biological materialism, where variable rates of neuron ring relative to di erent neuronal circuits produce all the di erent types of mental life we humans experience:`...mental phenomena, whether conscious or unconscious, whether visual or auditory, pains, tickles, itches, thoughts, and the rest of our mental life, are caused by processes going on in the brain' (p220 { stress removed), where these processes are`real biological phenomena' (p217).
5 This is analogous to a high-level program, even after being compiled into machine code, still existing as an entity in its own right as a textual entity about which certain judgements can be made (e.g. its complexity, structure, design).
6 Recently, another dimension has been added to the debate by Penrose (1989 Penrose ( , 1994 . CCS and AI have got it wrong, he argues, when associating thought, reasoning, consciousness and awareness with algorithms. Rather, algorithms, if they have any part to play at all in human intelligence, play a part at the`unconscious' or`subconscious' level, perhaps as a result of thousands of years of evolution. It is the role of consciousness to be non-algorithmic, i.e. to apply commonsense, judgement, understanding and artistic appraisal to the results of our (unconscious) algorithms.
`If we are to believe that neurons are the only things which control the sophisticated actions of animals, then the humble paramecium a single-cell, eukaryotic organism belonging to the kingdom protista] presents us with a profound problem. For she swims about her pond with her numerous tiny legs ... darting in the direction of bacterial food which she senses using a variety of mechanisms, or retreating at the prospect of danger, ready to swim o in another direction... Moreover, she can apparently even learn from her past experiences... How is all this achieved by an animal without a single neuron or synapse?' The implication, quite simply, is that neuroscientists have got it wrong if they claim that networks of neurons (single cells) adequately account for mind/brain: while a cell is the basic unit of living systems, this does not mean that the cell is primitive.
Molecular computing, which stands in the same relationship to biomolecular science as AI does to CCS and connectionism to neuroscience, is the computational paradigm derived from and/or inspired by biomolecular processes within cells (Carter, 1984; Conrad and Liberman, 1982; Hamero , 1987.) 7 So, what is molecular computing, and can it and its parent science provide an adequate account of mind/brain? A brief description of cell structure and function is required at this point.
A cell | typically 10 { 30 millionths of a metre across for humans | contains many specialised structures called organelles. The relevant ones here are the cell membrane (controls passage of substances into and out of the cell and encloses cell organelles as well as cell substances), cytoplasm (serves as a uid container for cell organelles and other cell substances as well as assists in the transport of substances within the cell), nucleus (directs all cell activity and carries hereditary information), endoplasmic reticulum (serves as a transport network and storage area for substances within the cell), ribosome (manufactures di erent kinds of cell protein), Golgi apparatus (packages protein for storage or transport out of the cell), lysosome (digests or breaks down food materials into simpler parts and removes waste materials from the cell), mitochondria (serve as the power supply of the cell by producing ATP | adenosine triphosphate | which is the source of energy for all cell activities), microtubules (serve as the support system or skeleton of the cell) and micro laments (assist in cell motility). Each organelle performs one or more special tasks to keep the cell alive. All the information directing every cell function is stored in large DNA molecules found in the nucleus (see Figure 1) .
A cell cannot function without DNA. The information it contains must be made available somehow to the rest of the cell as well as be passed on to all new cells. Although each cell contains the full complement of DNA, through some process which is not yet clearly understood certain parts of the DNA are switched on or o within cells, resulting in di erent types of cell producing di erent proteins for normal growth and functioning of the organism as a whole. The process by which the information in the DNA is carried out to the rest of the cell is through messenger RNA strands which leave the nucleus and attach themselves to the ribosomes, which then produce the protein for export from the cell. What is remarkable is that the DNA are large molecules made up of combinations of only four types of nucleotides | adenine, guanine, thymine and cytosine (called A, G, T, and C, respectively). It is estimated that the DNA in each one of our cells contains about 8 billion nucleotides, spread across 46 chromosomes (discrete molecular structures of DNA), each one of which takes the shape of a double helix. If all the DNA in one cell were stretched end to end, the length is estimated to be about two metres. Messenger RNA bang into these chromosomes and unzip part of the molecule, make a complementary copy of a certain length of the molecule, before leaving the nucleus for the ribosomes and protein manufacture. The process of DNA being mapped into mRNA is called transcription, whereas the process of duplicating all chromosomes is called replication. 8 Ribosomes produce the appropriate amino acids from the mRNA. For instance, the mRNA triplet GCU (guanine { cytosine { uracil) , which is an mRNA transcription of the DNA triplet CGT (cytosine { guanine { thymine), is mapped onto the amino acid alanine by ribosomes.
It may appear from the above that the transfer of information from the nucleus to the rest of the cell is a highly organised a air. This is not correct. Random collisions millions of times a second between RNA polymerase (an enzyme, which is a large protein which helps make and break bonds) and the DNA eventually lead to the RNA polymerase running into certain sequences of bases and latching onto them. These sequences of DNA bases are recognised by the RNA polymerase as start positions for transcriptions. The RNA polymerase then unravels the appropriate part of the DNA double helix. Free-oating bases in the nucleus attach themselves to the revealed DNA bases, forming a sequence which becomes the messenger protein construction (translation) takes place using the 20 basic amino acids, and the Golgi apparatus where individual amino acids are modi ed slightly to produce the variety of amino acids essential for life. A body cell is typically 10-30 millionths of a meter long and wide, and it is estimated that we have several trillion of such cells (for skin, muscles, liver, blood, heart, brain (a neuron is a brain cell), etc.). Each such body cell contains the full set of 46 chromosomes (discrete molecular structures of DNA) inherited from our mother and father (23 in each case, via sex cells). The`straight-line' length of the DNA in one cell is estimated to be 2 metres, which demonstrates the tightly packed nature of the chromosomes and their thinness. It is also estimated that the 46 chromosomes code for about 75,000 genes for humans, using about 8 billion bases (nucleotides). On average, about 100,000 bases are required for coding a gene, although this gure varies greatly from a few hundred to a few hundred thousand.
RNA. The double helix is re-formed as transcription continues along the unravelled DNA molecule. When a terminating sequence of bases is found in the DNA, the resulting messenger RNA is dispatched to the ribosomes, where combinations of three bases at a time in the messenger RNA are used to produce one of 20 di erent amino acids. Sequences of these amino acids (varying in length from a few hundred to a few thousand) are called polypeptide chains, which are packaged in the Golgi apparatus and then secreted from the cell for use by other cells in the organism. These polypeptide chains therefore`represent' the sequence of bases unravelled in the DNA molecule (Figure 1 ). Again, it may appear that the production of polypeptide chains out of individual amino acids is a highly organised a air. This again is not true: there are so many millions of molecular collisions each second within ribosomes during polypeptide production that some of these must be the correct ones for the proper production of the polypeptides. 9 For instance, appropriate polypeptides (proteins/enzymes) for continually producing hair of a certain colour for an individual are transferred from the individual's DNA in certain specialised hair-production cells.
Implications for cognition
So, what happens to the enzymes/proteins produced by ribosomes and the Golgi apparatus? Proteins (enzymes) carry out many vital functions in living organisms. As structural molecules, they provide much of the cytoskeletal framework of cells. As enzymes they act as biological catalysts that speed up the rate of cellular reactions. The chemical composition of one of our cells could be placed in a test-tube and observed, We may, after some time, notice some chemical reactions naturally occurring in the test-tube. There will be a long delay because the activation energy required to start a chemical reaction acts like an energy barrier over which the molecules must be raised for a reaction to take place. An enzyme essentially lowers the activation energy required for a reaction to proceed. An enzyme locks onto a molecule, starts a reaction, and then is released unchanged. The rate of enzyme combination and release is called the turnover rate and is about 1000 times a second for most enzymes, with variation between 100 per second and 10 million per second. The increase in reaction rate achieved by enzymes ranges from a minimum of about a million to as much as a trillion times faster than an uncatalysed reaction at equivalent concentrations and temperatures. From this it can be seen that the process of enzyme/protein production, as determined by our DNA, is absolutely critical to our continued well-being, otherwise we as chemical beings would not produce chemical reactions fast enough to keep us alive (e.g. respiration, digestion).
What inheritance now means, according to biomolecular science, is the set of genes (DNA) which code for the production of appropriate enzymes which increase the rate of chemical reactions in our cells, where the nature and rate of reactions is determined by the nature of the enzymes. We are all essentially the same chemically: what di ers is the enzymes produced by the DNA inherited by our parents and other factors (e.g. mutation of individual bases and genes by random means), and these enzymes control cellular processes di erently for di erent people, thereby leading to di erent physical characteristics.
The applications of molecular computing are quite clear in the area of biomedical research. For instance, cloning is the process in which a diploid cell divides and produces a whole new organism through complete DNA replication (rather than the nuclei of two haploid cells merging to produce o -spring). 10 Also, various inborn errors of matabolism and chromosome errors which give rise to genetic diseases can be explained as errors in transcription or replication and through DNA mutation, such as sickle cell anemia (reduction in the solubility of hemoglobin in the blood), Tay-Sachs disease (absence of speci c enzymes that hydrolyse speci c lipid molecules), diabetes mellitus (insulin de ciency), hemophilia (improper clotting of blood), phenylketonuria (associated with mental retardation) and albinism (the production of skin pigment melanin is blocked). Viral infections (colds, u, measles, chickenpox and mumps, for example) can be explained at a deep level and resulting computational models can generate hypotheses concerning their evolution and treatment. 11 Cancers of various sorts exhibit a wild, uncontrolled growth, dividing and piling over each other in a disorderly arrangement and pushing aside the normal cells in a tissue. Similarly, computational models can provide a useful service here in prediction and treatment. But what are the implications of molecular computing and its parent, biomolecular science, for mind/brain? Although a cell has a functional architecture and performs many functions, each of which is determined by the DNA information within a nucleus, the idea of a cell moving through various representational states as it processes information, where there representational states (as required by CCS) involve the manipulation of symbols, does not sit easily with the facts. Molecular computing is essentially a copying (translation and replication) process. However, if molecular computing and biomolecular science are to o er alternative accounts to CCS and neuroscience, there must be some method by which elements of molecular computing are tied up with representations, information processing and consciousness.
There are a variety of proposals in the molecular computing literature concerning the way that cells could give rise to information processing and consciousness. They can be split roughly into two types: the rst type deals with the way that any cell can be regarded as an information processing device, and the second 10 Both translation of replication involve the unraveling of the DNA strands and the use of one strand as a template for joining together nucleic acid units in the proper sequence. After translation, the DNA recoils to its original form, but after replication the two original strands have separated, each with a new complementary partner strand.
11 A virus is a set of genes packaged inside a protein coat. Inside the coat of most human viruses is a single strand of DNA, coded to reproduce itself. A virus borrows the ribosomes of cells in a host organism to make proteins. New virus particles are formed which break out of the cell to infect other cells. A cell infected with a latent virus (unusual for humans) shows no sign of infection for a long time and may even have made many copies of itself (with the latent virus implanted in its DNA) before something triggers the virus into activity. AIDS is a highly unusual (for humans), latent retrovirus which injects RNA (and not DNA) into T4 white blood cells (an important cell in a human's immune system). Reverse transcriptase then converts the RNA into DNA which is subsequently inserted into the T4 cell's normal DNA. White blood cells divide normally, carrying their infected DNA into new copies of themselves. When the latent infection is triggered, the emission of new copies of the AIDS virus causes the T4 cells to die, leading to a severe breakdown of the immunity system. deals speci cally with brain cells and attempts to use properties of neurons for accounting for consciousness. Among the proposals of the rst type are claims that cells represent information through (i) reaction di usion systems (chemical reaction waves within a cell propagate at uniform speed and interact with other waves within the cell to produce complex patterns (Conrad and Liberman, 1982; Winfree and Strogatz (1984) )), (ii) cellular automata (a large number of identical cells connected in a uniform pattern and communicating only with other cells in their neighbourhood operate collectively to produce complex behaviour (von Neumann, 1966) ), and (iii) the protoplasm (dynamic activities of cytoskeletal structures including cytoplasmic microtubules within a cell produce rudimentary consciousness (Hamero , 1987; Penrose, 1994) ). Among proposals of the second type are (i) holograms (the brain perceives sensory information by analysis of the interference of neural ring frequencies, resulting in a domain in which space and time are enfolded (Pribram, 1986) ), and (ii) cytoskeletal activity, but this time within neurons and at a quantum mechanics level (Hamero , 1987 , Penrose 1994 . 12 However, it must be said that all these proposals are highly speculative, leaving CCS with its stress on computation and neuroscience with its use of mathematically rigorous connectionist networks in the lead as far as clear proposals are concerned.
4 The`mind gene'
The question now is: Is there a mind gene? That is, is there a part of our chromosomes which produces enzymes/proteins which, when released in, say, neurons, give rise to consciousness and mind? The current approach to this question consists of appealing to an evolutionary account. As Crick (1994, p12 ) says about language:`...the understanding of the evolution of language will not come only from what linguists are doing, but from nding how language develops in the brain... and then nding the genes for it and trying to work out when those genes came in evolution.' Two types of answer can be predicted. The rst depends on a contextual approach where, for instance, to account for, say, a type of sensation is to identify which part of one's DNA (hereditary information) is responsible for producing the polypeptide chains associated with that sensation and then to derive an evolutionary account based on neighbouring DNA code. An account of desire may be based on identifying which part of one's chromosomes is responsible for producing the chemical proteins/enzymes associated with desire and then determining what is on either side of the DNA for desire. It may be that on one side in the chromosome is the code for producing polypeptides associated with goal-motivated behaviour, and on the other the code for producing polypeptides associated with planproducing behaviour. An evolutionary account of desire would then be based on some story which related goals to plans by means of desire: At some stage in the evolution of consciousness, it was found bene cial for organisms to have desires as a way of bridging the gap between goals and plans for achieving those goals, for example. Such contextual answers are subject to the criticism that whole genes may be moved from one part of a chromosome to another through random displacement or peculiarities of DNA folding.
The second type of answer depends on identifying homologous (common ancestor) DNA. The gene for desire may be found to contain signi cant amounts of DNA associated with, say, goal-motivated behaviour as well as its own specialised DNA. Desire can then be explained as having evolved from (inherited) goalmotivated behaviour but also to have specialised with respect to goal-motivated behaviour. 13 Such homologous answers are subject to the criticism that specialised genes may contain signi cant exceptions to what their common ancestor gene contains and may also inherit from more than one common ancestor. 14 5 Conclusion
What the above has shown is that Rumelhart and McClelland (1985) were surely right when they state:
T]here's more twixt the computational and the implementational than is dreamt of, even in Marr's philosophy...' (p196). The problem is that each level, to lend credence to its claim for accounting for mind/brain, posits a form of computation and representation not just appropriate for that level but also necessary and perhaps su cient for explaining cognitive phenomena at that level. CCS proposes symbolic computation, algorithm and representation, neuroscience proposes mathematically based extraction of information and knowledge contained in connectionist networks (by means of hyperplane analysis, for example), and biomolecular science proposes molecular computing which is based on biomolecular processes within the cell nucleus. The recent interest in mind/brain issues shown by leading gures in the physical and biomolecular sciences indicates that cognitive science and neuroscience no longer have the eld to themselves. There is already competition between the biomolecular and physical sciences as to which is going to prove to be the more suited for accounting for mind/brain.
The most immediate implication for CCS is that the notion of computation, tied as it is to the concepts of rule-following, algorithm, e ective procedure and TM-computability (areas attacked by objections (a) and (c) described earlier), goes back into the melting pot. What may emerge is a concept of computation which is tied more closely to biomolecular principles (transcription, translation, replication, mutation, and so on) than to a formally speci able and repeatable sequence of steps to reliably achieve a task. With regard to neuroscience (objection (b)) the most immediate implication is that neurons are at too high a level, and so any neuroscienti c account of mind/brain in terms of layered networks will not be accurate. What is needed is a clearer understanding of the internal workings of neurons in biomolecular terms. Physical scientists may argue that biomolecular computing is still at too high a level and that its own computational arm, quantum computing (e.g. Deutsch, 1985 Deutsch, , 1992 Menneer and Narayanan, 1995 ) provides a more appropriate computational level. A radical physical scientist may also claim that consciousness/thought is a feature of the brain's physical actions where these physical actions cannot even be adequately expressed in any computational terms (Penrose, 1994) | the physical theory has no computational arm. The scienti c foundations of mind/brain are currently up for grabs.
But the anti-materialist and perhaps anti-reductionist nature of CCS (objection (b)) may lead to it becoming isolated because of its unwillingness to accept computational paradigms and representations of levels lower than the algorithmic as real alternatives for an account of mind/brain. What is being proposed in this paper is that CCS should adopt, for the purposes of scienti c hypothesising, biomolecular paradigms. Even if this level is proved ultimately to be wrong, at least CCS will be contributing solutions to a fresh range of problems, some of which (e.g. explaining the biomolecular basis of diseases) have profound implications for humanity. More interestingly, though, if CCS adopts biomolecular paradigms, they can cut the ground away from under connectionists' feet by pointing out that, while networks of neurons may well perform certain tasks non-symbolically, within each neuron there are processes which can be described symbolically. Such processes are described using the symbol structures and processes of biochemistry (e.g. nucleotides, transcription, replication, enzyme production) and physical chemistry (e.g. molecule construction out of atoms, molecule folding) even if it is not currently clear whether these symbol structures and processes are computational. Neertheless, it can pointed out that nonsymbolic behaviour at the level of networks rests fundamentally on biochemical symbol structures and processes within each neuron making up the network. Nonsymbolic processes at the neural network level could be emergent properties of symbolic processes at the individual neuron level.
